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CASE NOTE 
 
IF ALL INVESTMENT BANKS ARE CONFLICTED, WHY 
BLAME BARCLAYS? AN EXAMINATION OF INVESTMENT 
BANK FEE STRUCTURES AND DEL MONTE FOODS 
BONNIE WHITE† 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster held in In re Del Monte Foods 
Co. Shareholders Litigation that the Del Monte Foods board of directors 
breached its duty of care to the Del Monte stockholders by failing to 
identify and guard against its investment banker Barclays’ conflicts in a 
merger transaction with Blue Acquisition Group.1 The court identified four 
instances of misbehavior throughout the sale process: (1) Barclays met 
secretly with potential bidders to solicit interest in acquiring Del Monte 
before the company was up for sale, and prior to being hired as the compa-
ny’s sell-side advisor;2  (2) once the company was up for sale, Barclays 
facilitated a relationship between two competing bidders in violation of 
confidentiality agreements between the bidders and the company; 3  (3) 
Barclays planned to and in fact did obtain the company’s permission to 
provide the acquirers’ financing;4 and (4) subsequent to the approval of the 
merger agreement, Barclays conducted the go-shop despite an agreement to 
 
† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 161. J.D., 2013, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, Boston University. 
1 25 A.3d 813, 817-18, 836 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
2 Id. at 820, 822. 
3 Id. at 823. 
4 Id. at 826. 
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finance the acquirers.5 And how did the Del Monte board breach its duty? It 
didn’t stop Barclays. 
What could the board have done differently? The court explained that, 
despite having relied in good faith on Barclays’ independence and expertise, 
the Del Monte board breached its duty of care by failing to realize that 
Barclays had pieced together a deal resulting in its earning more than forty 
million dollars in fees from its dual role.6 The board, according to the court, 
should have recognized that Barclays suffered from a conflict of interest as 
it stood on both sides of the transaction by providing both sell-side advice 
and buy-side financing.7 I argue in this Note, however, that Barclays, and 
indeed all sell-side advisors, face a serious conflict of interest in standing on 
even one side of the transaction—by receiving success fees contingent on 
the consummation of a merger. For that reason, it is unclear whether the 
Del Monte decision imposed on boards of directors a duty to identify 
conflicts that are more serious than those ordinarily accepted in the invest-
ment banking industry, or merely a duty to fully disclose all conflicts. But 
considering the facts of Del Monte, I argue that the possibility of obtaining 
permission to provide buy-side financing is just another conflict shared by 
all full-service investment banks, and that additional disclosure would not 
have changed the outcome of the case. As a result, I conclude that Delaware 
courts should either (1) accept that investment bankers are necessarily conflict-
ed when working on the sale of a corporation or (2) require a fundamentally 
different fee structure for investment bankers working on such a sale, and 
ultimately advocate for the elimination of success fees and staple financing. 
This Note proceeds as follows: In Part I, I describe investment banking 
services provided in the sale of a corporation and common fee structures 
used in those services. In Part II, I contextualize Del Monte with respect to 
relevant case law, and in Part III, I describe the facts of the case. In Parts 
IV and V, respectively, I present the claims brought against the Del Monte 
board as well as the Delaware Court of Chancery’s response to those claims. 
Part VI describes the consequences of the court’s holding for Del Monte 
and Blue Acquisition Group. Finally, in Part VII, I argue that Barclays’ 
conflicts were no more significant than the conflicts that exist for nearly all 
full-service investment banks, and that, for this reason, additional disclosure 
would not have affected the outcome. I do make the caveat that the Del 
 
5 Id. at 828; see also id. at 827 (identifying a forty-five-day post-signing go-shop period during 
which Del Monte had the right to solicit competing offers). 
6 Id. at 818, 834-35. 
7 Id. at 835-36. 
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Monte board did breach its duty of care by permitting Barclays to conduct 
the go-shop after Barclays had committed to provide the acquirers’ financ-
ing. Finally, I analyze the standard for investment bank conflicts going forward 
and advocate for eliminating success fees and staple financing altogether. 
I. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE SALE OF A COMPANY 
A. Fairness Opinions, Sell-Side Advising, Buy-Side Financing,  
and Staple Financing 
Investment banks participate in the sale of a company in three funda-
mental ways. First, investment banks provide fairness opinions that (a) 
value a company using various valuation methods, and (b) determine 
whether, given a company’s value, a particular price falls within a reasonable 
range of fairness. 8  Boards of directors use fairness opinions to justify 
accepting or rejecting a given offer.9 Second, investment banks provide sell-
side advising to companies that have received offers from one or more 
potential acquirers, or that are interested in soliciting such offers.10 Sell-side 
advising often requires the banks to act as emissaries between target and 
acquirer and to conduct go-shops to solicit additional bids for the compa-
ny. 11  Banks also provide particularized knowledge about challenges and 
opportunities available in a given industry and advise on strategic alterna-
tives.12 Companies look to investment banks for insight on how to capitalize 
on assets that make a company unique in its industry. Although providing a 
fairness opinion may be analytically distinct from providing sell-side advice, 
“investment banks delivering fairness opinions in a corporate control 
 
8 See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2006) (“A fairness opin-
ion is an opinion . . . that a transaction meets a threshold level of fairness from a financial perspective.”). 
9 See id. at 1558-59 (“The board will rely on this opinion to satisfy its duty of care in the 
determination of whether or not to proceed.”). 
10 Cf. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 
610, 627-28 & nn.123-25 (2013) (explaining that a board of directors of a corporation that is up for 
sale can satisfy its Revlon duties to maximize shareholder value by relying on advice from 
independent financial advisors and canvassing the market). 
11 Cf. Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Impli-
cations, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 730 (2008) (explaining that go-shops, which allow companies to seek 
out higher bidders after they have conditionally committed to sell to a particular acquirer, “emerged 
as an important new deal-making technology during the private equity boom of 2005–2007”). 
12 See COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE M&A PROCESS: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 77-78 (2005) (“An investment bank is a full 
service financial advisor that can generally provide advice regarding valuation of the target 
(including rendering a fairness opinion), conduct the marketing process, advise on the appropriate 
structure for the transaction, participate in the negotiation of financial terms and even raise funds 
to finance the transaction.”).  
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transaction typically are also retained to render general financial advice with 
respect to the relevant transaction.” 13  Third, investment banks provide 
partial or full financing to, and become creditors of, bidders in the event 
that an acquisition actually takes place.14  
Finally, investment banks sometimes combine these services. Staple 
financing, for example, occurs when an investment bank acts as sell-side 
advisor for a target company and agrees up front that, in the event that a 
merger takes place, the bank will provide financing to an acquirer if the 
acquirer needs it. 15  Staple financing has been criticized for creating a 
conflict of interest for bankers who, on the one hand, seek as sell-side 
advisors to maximize the price paid to the target’s stockholders, and on the 
other, want as a creditor to ensure that an acquirer will be able to repay its 
financing obligations.16 Further, investment banks that offer staple financing 
may favor bidders that are more likely to need financing, such as private 
equity firms, to the exclusion of parties less likely to require financing, such 
as strategic bidders. 17  The literature dealing with staple financing has 
primarily focused on balancing benefits against the potential for harm, by 
looking, for example, at the fact that allowing staple financing makes 
obtaining financing easier in market conditions where it is difficult to 
otherwise procure financing.18 
B. Investment Banks’ Fees 
When an investment bank provides a one-time fairness opinion, it usu-
ally does so for a specified transaction fee, which it collects regardless of 
whether an acquisition occurs.19 Proxy statements usually disclose the basic 
 
13 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1586. 
14 See COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 77-78. 
15 Christopher Foulds, My Banker’s Conflicted and I Couldn’t Be Happier: The Curious Durability 
of Staple Financing, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. ���, ��� (����). Staple financing may be more desirable 
in a poor credit market where the availability of financing is limited. See id. at 521-22.  
16 See Davidoff, supra note 8, at ���� (noting that an investment bank providing staple financ-
ing “has an incentive for a lower target price so that the acquirer will not be over-leveraged after 
the acquisition”).  
17 See Foulds, supra note 15, at ��� (“The concern [with staple financing] is that the target[]’s 
financial advisor may steer the sale to those bidders that will use staple financing, and away from a 
potentially higher bidder not using staple financing.”); id. at 524 (“The main concern is the 
potential that the seller will unfairly favor one bidder over another for reasons unrelated to 
obtaining the highest value for the target’s shareholders. The suspicion is that a sell-advisor may 
skew an auction in favor of those bidders who will also use the stapled-lender for financing.”). 
18 See, e.g., id. at 521-22. 
19 Perella Weinberg Partners LP, for example, earned $3 million solely for providing a 
second fairness opinion in the Del Monte–Blue Acquisition Group merger. In re Del Monte 
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fee structure—that is, whether there is a contingent or set fee—underlying a 
fairness opinion.20 By contrast, when an investment bank provides sell-side 
advising, the bank usually charges three types of fees: a standard minimum 
transaction fee, a “success” or “incentive” fee, and reimbursement for 
expenses.21 The payment of a success fee is contingent on the deal closing 
and is determined by a percentage of the total value of the deal.22 One 
variation of the success fee is the “Lehman Formula,” which awards fees in 
the amount of 5% of the first $x million of the deal, 4% of the second $x 
million, 3% of the third $x million, 2% of the fourth $x million, and 1% of the 
remainder.23 Current advising fees more commonly amount to about .05% 
of a transaction’s value, however.24 Success fees have been criticized for 
creating a conflict of interest on the part of investment banks because the 
relative size of the success fee as compared to the transaction fee may cause 
a bank to encourage a target to accept a price that does not adequately value 
the company for the sake of pushing any transaction through.25 The poten-
tial for conflicts has caused some commentators to argue that “the invest-
ment banker will have an economic incentive to persuade the seller to sell 
the business even if the price is low or the non-price terms are unfair to the 
seller,”26  to which boards of directors should respond by selecting only 
investment banks with excellent reputations and by actively overseeing the 
chosen banks’ conduct.27 
Providing buy-side financing is often the most lucrative activity for 
investment banks.28 For one, when an investment bank provides financing 
 
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 826 (Del. Ch. 2011). When a fairness opinion is issued as 
part of an investment bank’s sell-side advising engagement, however, the fee for the fairness 
opinion is often subsumed into the bank’s “success” fee, and is therefore dependent on the 
consummation of the transaction. Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1586. 
20 Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair Summary: Delaware’s Framework for 
Disclosing Fairness Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 881, 900 (2008). 
21 See John F. Seegal, Investment Banking Fees, in 1 ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRI-
VATELY HELD COMPANY 173, 175 (2009). 
22 See Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1586 (“The manner of compensation [for sell-side advising] 
is a success fee payable to the bank at transaction milestones such as announcement or completion.”). 
23 COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 79-80. 
24 Foulds, supra note 15, at 525. 
25 See Seegal, supra note 21, at ��� (“A flaw in the Lehman formula and other similar declin-
ing percentage approaches is that they tend to reward the investment banker more highly for 
selling the business than for selling the business at the highest price.”). 
26 Id. at 176. 
27 See id. 
28 See Gina Chon & Shira Ovide, Judge Blasts Barclays over Del Monte Deal, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576146471401456158.html 
(“Providing financing for acquirers usually generates more fees for investment banks than advising 
sellers.”). 
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for an acquirer, the bank does not accept the same level of risk that the deal 
will not go through as it does when providing sell-side financing. Financing 
fees are stated as a fixed percentage, typically between 1.3 and 1.5%, of the 
total value of the loan.29 The investment bank also becomes a creditor to the 
acquirer, who is required to repay the financing. 
II. BEFORE DEL MONTE 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. established that, 
where it is clear that a company is up for sale, a board of directors’ primary 
duty with respect to the sale is to obtain the best price attainable for the 
stockholders. 30  Smith v. Van Gorkom, although pre-Revlon, implied that 
boards could satisfy their duties in the sale of a company by procuring a 
fairness opinion and advice from an investment banker with respect to the 
sale.31 With these two propositions in place—that a board must seek the 
best price and that a board may rely on the expertise of investment bankers 
to achieve that goal—obtaining fairness opinions and sell-side advice has 
become best practice for Delaware corporations. 
However, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.32 and In re Toys “R” Us, 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation33 complicated the view that a board may always 
rely on an investment bank’s expertise to satisfy its fiduciary duties when 
selling a company. In Macmillan, Mills Acquisition Company sought to 
acquire Macmillan, Inc., which had already signed a merger agreement with 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).34 Prior to entering into the KKR 
merger agreement, Macmillan’s board, which had been planning to restruc-
ture the company, received an offer from the Bass Group to purchase 
Macmillan for $64 per share.35 Evans, a board member with significant 
financial interest in the company, opposed the merger and met privately with 
Macmillan’s investment banker, Lazard Freres & Co., regarding the offer.36 
Lazard, over which Evans had significant influence, advised Macmillan’s 
 
29 Foulds, supra note 15, at 525. 
30 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
31 See 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); see also Davidoff, supra note 8, at 1559 (noting that the court in Van Gorkom 
“placed heavy reliance on the lack of a fairness opinion or other reliable valuation in a corporate 
control transaction to sustain a holding that an acquiree board breached its duty of care”). 
32 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
33 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
34 Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264. 
35 Id. at 1268. 
36 Id. at 1267-68. 
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board that the proposed recapitalization was fair and that the Bass Group’s 
offer was not;37 however, when the board rejected the Bass Group’s higher 
counteroffer and adopted the recapitalization plan, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the board had 
improperly relied on Lazard’s mischaracterizations of the available alterna-
tives.38 At that point, the board immediately put the company up for sale.39 
In spite of communication from Maxwell, another potential acquirer, that 
he would top any bid by his competitor, KKR, the Macmillan board entered into 
a merger agreement with KKR, whom Evans favored for personal reasons.40 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Macmillan’s board had 
breached its duty of care because, “[a]lthough the Macmillan board was 
fully aware of its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the 
auction, the directors wholly delegated the creation and administration of 
the auction to an array of Evans’ hand-picked investment advisors.” 41 
Because Macmillan’s investment bank had been operating under Evans’ 
control, the board was not entitled to rely on its financial advice. The court 
held that “[w]hile a board of directors may rely in good faith upon ‘infor-
mation, opinions, reports or statements presented’ by corporate officers, 
employees and experts ‘selected with reasonable care,’ it may not avoid its 
active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as significant as the sale of 
corporate control.”42 
Sixteen years later, in Toys “R” Us, then-Vice Chancellor Strine declined 
to preliminarily enjoin a merger between Toys “R” Us and KKR,43 despite 
the plaintiffs’ “sketch[ing] out a picture of a passive board who deferred too 
easily to the wishes of a CEO, Eyler, and financial advisor, First Boston.”44 
Toys “R” Us originally planned to sell only its toy division, but changed its 
mind when it received a bid of $25.25 per share for the entire company.45 
Toys “R” Us, once committed to a sale of the company, quickly accepted a 
bid from KKR for significantly more than the next highest offer it had 
received.46 Then-Vice Chancellor Strine found that, while Eyler did have 
some incentive to sell the company because of the “golden parachute” in his 
 
37 Id. at 1270. 
38 Id. at 1271. 
39 Id. at 1272. 
40 Id. at 1272-74. 
41 Id. at 1281. 
42 Id. (citation omitted). 
43 In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 980 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
44 Id. at 1002. 
45 Id. at 986-87, 991-93. 
46 Id. at 993-95. 
11 White Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2014 2:08 PM 
100 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 162: 93 
 
employment contract, his own financial status did not ultimately motivate 
his decision to sell to KKR.47 Further, the then-Vice Chancellor decided 
that First Boston’s incentive fee structure48 and the fact that it agreed to 
provide buy-side financing to KKR did not result in the investment bank 
“tilt[ing] the process in order to jack up its fees and profits,” noting that 
incentive fees “ha[ve] been recognized as proper by our courts.”49 Thus, 
while Macmillan required that a board actively oversee the sales process and 
identify conflicts of the dominating personalities involved, Toys “R” Us 
suggested that some investment banks’ conflicts may be acceptable. 
III. DEL MONTE 
A. The Parties 
In 2010—before litigation began—Del Monte was one of the largest and 
most profitable food distributors in the United States: Richard Wolford, 
Del Monte’s then-CEO, remarked that over the course of several years “Del 
Monte [had transformed] from a $1 billion consumer foods business into a 
branded pet and consumer products company with more than $3.7 billion in 
revenues,”50 generating $250 million in cash flow and increasing dividends 
by 80%.51 Interestingly, Del Monte’s success came after a period of decline 
in the 1990s. In the 1980s, Del Monte was a subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds 
Industries, later renamed RJR Nabisco.52 When KKR acquired Nabisco in 
1988, it sold Del Monte, which continued its canned foods business but, in 
order to stay afloat, was forced to sell many divisions that today are house-
hold names.53  
Blue Acquisition Group is owned by private equity firms KKR, Center-
view Partners, and Vestar Capital Partners.54 KKR is an infamous private 
equity firm whose portfolio companies include Dollar General, Duracell, 
 
47 Id. at 1004-05. 
48 First Boston stood to earn an additional $7 million from Toys “R” Us if it facilitated a sale 
of the entire company rather than the toy division alone. Id. at 998 & n.26.  
49 Id. at 1005-06. 
50 Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duties & Aiding & 
Abetting, para. 3, In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 
6027-VCL), 2011 WL 118896. 
51 Id. 
52 Del Monte Foods Company History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/ 
company-histories/Del-Monte-Foods-Company-Company-History.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
53 Id. Among the divisions sold was Hawaiian Punch. Id. 
54 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817. 
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and Nabisco—Del Monte’s former parent.55  KKR is no stranger to the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, having litigated Macmillan, Toys “R” Us, and 
countless other cases; its notorious takeover of Nabisco was the subject of 
the 1990 book56 and 1993 made-for-television movie, Barbarians at the Gate.57 
Centerview’s private equity arm, Centerview Capital, was founded in 2006 
and invests solely in market consumer businesses. 58  In addition to Del 
Monte, its portfolio consists entirely of The Nielsen Company and Riche-
lieu Foods, Inc.59 Vestar is a private equity firm whose completed invest-
ments totaled $30 billion in 2011.60 Prior to forming Vestar in 1988, its 
founders were principals of The First Boston Corporation’s Management 
Buyout Group61—the investment bank at issue in Toys “R” Us. 
Barclays PLC is a global, U.K.-based financial services provider with 
“over 300 years of history and expertise in banking.”62 The KKR acquisition 
was not Del Monte’s first interaction with Barclays. In fact, Barclays 
functioned as one of Del Monte’s “principal investment banks,”63 participat-
ing in various transactions in 2009 and 2010 that generated roughly $3.6 
million in fees.64 Barclays was on even friendlier terms with KKR—over the 
same period, Barclays earned over $66 million in fees from at least six KKR 
consumer and retail projects.65 At the time, Peter “P.J.” Moses was the 
Barclays managing director with coverage responsibility for Del Monte.66  
 
55 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., KKR, Vestar and Centerview Complete Acquisition 
of Del Monte Foods (Mar. 8, 2011), http://investors.delmonte.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=662562. 
56 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF 
RJR NABISCO (1990).  
57 BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (HBO 1993). 
58 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55; Company Overview of Centerview Capi-
tal Holdings, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/ 
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=46401796 (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
59 Portfolio, CENTERVIEW CAPITAL, http://cv.kbddev.com/consumer/portfolio/ (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2013). 
60 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55. 
61  History, VESTAR CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.vestarcapital.com/about-vestar/history 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
62 About Us, BARCLAYS, http://group.barclays.com/About-us (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
63 In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
64 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFA ��A), 
at 5 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/866873/000119312511024568/ 
ddefa14a.htm. 
65 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820.  
66 Id. at 819. 
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B. The Deal 
Before Del Monte ever considered selling, Barclays’ Peter Moses 
approached several potential bidders to gauge their interest in acquiring the 
company.67 At a January 2010 meeting with KKR, Moses described his plan 
to coordinate the sale of Del Monte: he believed the company would 
privately solicit targeted bids and implied that KKR would be included in 
the private solicitation.68 KKR informed Moses that it was prepared to 
“take the next step,” but before KKR could approach Del Monte about a 
potential acquisition, Apollo Management, with whom Barclays had also 
met, sent Del Monte a letter of interest.69  
Based on the companies’ longstanding relationship, Del Monte contacted 
Barclays for advice on how to proceed with Apollo. Barclays did not inform 
Del Monte that it had discussed a potential acquisition with Apollo, nor did 
the Del Monte board inquire whether Barclays had met with Apollo or any 
other firms.70 Barclays also failed to mention that it had circulated internal 
memos describing its intention to provide financing should a deal come to 
fruition.71 Instead, Peter Moses suggested that Del Monte privately solicit 
bids via a targeted process that included Apollo, KKR working with Cen-
terview, the Carlyle Group, CVC Partners, and the Blackstone Group.72 
When information leaked that Del Monte was accepting bids, Vestar and 
Campbell’s Soup were also included. 73  The chosen bidders consisted 
exclusively of private equity firms rather than strategic parties who would 
 
67 Id. at 820. 
68 See id. 
69 Id. Apollo was identified only as “Bidder A” in the Preliminary Proxy Statement sent to 
Del Monte shareholders. See Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 56. 
70 Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
& Aiding & Abetting, para. 38, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 675719. Barclays 
did, however, note that it “knew many of the entities that might be an interested buyer.” Brief in 
Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 5, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-
VCL), 2011 WL 487121. 
71 See Brief in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 5 (quoting Barclays’ internal 
January 2010 “Project Hunt (Del Monte) Screen Committee Memo,” which stated that “Barclays 
will look to participate in the acquisition financing once [Del Monte] has reached a definitive 
agreement with a buyer”). 
72 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820-��. Plaintiffs and the court failed to address the fact that, at this 
point, the Del Monte board of directors formed a Strategic Committee to identify the parties 
from whom to solicit bids and to evaluate those bids. See Del Monte Defendants’ Opposition to 
Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 
WL 487122 (“The Strategic Committee . . . expressly limited [Del Monte’s] outreach at this initial 
stage to private equity firms . . . .”). 
73 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 821. 
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not need Barclays’ financing.74 All potential bidders signed confidentiality 
agreements preventing them from communicating with one another in 
formulating their bids.75 By March 11, 2010, Apollo, KKR, Carlyle, CVC, 
and Vestar submitted their bids.76 On March 18, 2010, however, the Del 
Monte board abruptly ended the process, deciding that it was in the stock-
holders’ best interests at that time to remain independent.77 
In April and May 2010, KKR approached Del Monte about a deal, but 
the company was not receptive.78 In September, Peter Moses met with 
KKR and Vestar separately to suggest that, in violation of their confidenti-
ality agreements, the firms pair up to make a new offer.79 The parties also 
agreed that KKR would approach Del Monte to begin negotiations but 
would conceal the fact that it intended to partner with Vestar until the last 
minute.80 Pursuant to that strategy, KKR, still partnered with Centerview, 
delivered a written indication of interest to Del Monte.81 The Del Monte 
board considered the offer and, departing from its earlier decision to remain 
independent, ultimately decided to pursue a single-bidder strategy in favor 
of KKR and Centerview.82 Over the next several weeks, Del Monte negotiated 
the terms of the transaction with KKR.83 It was not until nearly a month 
after submitting its letter of interest that KKR asked to include Vestar in 
the deal—the Del Monte board summarily granted the request.84 The same 
 
74 See Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 41. Bar-
clays, however, claimed that it presented Del Monte as an acquisition opportunity to “a broad 
range of strategic buyers and private equity firms.” Barclays Capital Inc.’s Answer to the 
Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint at 13, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-
VCL), 2011 WL 1213007. 
75 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 821. 
76 Id. at 822. 
77 Id. Del Monte notes in its answer to the amended complaint that it decided, based on “the 
Company’s strong results in the third fiscal quarter of 2010 and the perceived lower level of 
execution risk inherent in the Company’s long-range plan,” not to pursue a sale at that time. The 
Individual Del Monte Defendants’ Answer to the Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action 
Complaint at 23, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 1235372; see also Brief in 
Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 10 (indicating that Del Monte’s stock price rose 
roughly 37% between the time it initially solicited bids and the time it considered those bids). 
78 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 822-��. While plaintiffs alleged in their initial complaint that Mr. 
Wolford met with KKR to discuss the acquisition, Del Monte contended in its answer that the 
parties met to discuss different joint investment opportunities, in particular a joint acquisition of 
Waggin’ Train LLC. Individual Del Monte Defendants’ Answer, supra note 77, at 23-24. 
79 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 823. 
80 Id. at 823-24. 
81 Id. at 823. 
82 Id. at 824. The Del Monte board of directors did, however, reject KKR’s request for exclu-
sivity. Del Monte Defendants’ Opposition, supra note 72, at 15. 
83 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 825. 
84 Id. 
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day, the London Evening Standard publicized KKR’s attempt to acquire Del 
Monte Foods.85 
Barclays then asked Del Monte’s permission to partially finance the 
merger.86 The Del Monte board granted the request and hired a second 
investment bank, Perella Weinberg Partners LP, to provide an independent 
fairness opinion for an additional $3 million.87 Although the board recog-
nized that Barclays’ conflict of interest arising out of its participation in the 
financing would require an additional fairness opinion, it nevertheless 
permitted Barclays to conduct the 45-day go-shop period between late 
November 2010 and mid-January 2011.88 
A merger agreement was signed on November 24, 2010, in which Blue 
Acquisition Group agreed to acquire Del Monte Foods via a $5.3 billion 
leveraged buyout.89 The merger amounted to $19 per share of common 
stock, a 40% premium over the average closing price.90  The agreement 
contained a “fiduciary out” for Del Monte, and a termination fee.91 The first 
round of proxy materials was released on January 12, 2011, and a second 
round was sent out on February 4, 2011.92 Before stockholders could vote on the 
transaction, plaintiffs filed a derivative suit seeking a preliminary injunction.93  
 
85 See Rosamund Urwin, City Wild with Talk a Suitor Is Stalking the Man from Del Monte, 
LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.standard.co.uk/business/city-wild-
with-talk-a-suitor-is-stalking-the-man-from-del-monte-6534109.html. In their original complaint, 
shareholders alleged that KKR approached Vestar in response to this article, which “destroyed the 
de facto exclusivity that KKR/Centerview had managed to secure for itself.” Consolidated Verified 
Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 71. 
86 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 825-26. 
87 Id. at ���. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that Del Monte’s board of directors, 
in considering whether to accept Barclays’ request to provide financing, did not consider (�) 
whether allowing Barclays to provide financing would speed up the process, (�) whether it would 
be necessary for KKR to secure financing, (�) whether it would increase KKR’s bid, or (4) whether 
Del Monte could use the request as leverage to obtain additional consideration in the transaction. 
Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 73. 
88 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 827-28. 
89 Id. at 817. 
90 Id. The entire transaction was valued at roughly $5.3 billion, $1.3 billion of which was debt 
assumed. Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., KKR, Vestar and Centerview Enter into 
Agreement to Acquire Del Monte Foods (Nov. 25, 2010), http://investors.delmonte.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=662531.  
91 See Answering Brief of the Sponsor Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 3-4, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 495646 (noting 
that the termination fee was “only 1.13% of the $5.3 billion total deal value during the go-shop and 
2.26% post go-shop”). 
92 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 828-29. 
93 Id. at 829-30. 
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C. The Banks’ Fees 
Although Del Monte did not disclose its fee structure with Barclays, its 
proxy statement revealed that the company paid $2.5 million for Barclays’ 
fairness opinion, that it would pay $23.5 million upon completion of the 
merger, and that Barclays stood to earn between $21 and $24 million from 
financing the merger.94 Thus, of the roughly $47.5 million that Barclays 
stood to earn in the transaction, slightly more than half was for financing 
and slightly less than half was for its role as sell-side advisor. For providing 
its fairness opinion, Perella Weinberg earned a flat fee of $3 million.95 
IV. THE LITIGATION 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs raised duty of loyalty, inadequate disclo-
sure, and duty of care claims.96 This Part considers each of those claims in turn. 
A. Duty of Loyalty 
The plaintiffs’ primary claims prior to discovery were that the merger 
undervalued Del Monte Foods97 and that Del Monte’s management was 
improperly persuaded to agree to the merger terms because KKR offered 
them management equity and assurance that they would keep their posi-
tions within the company after the merger was consummated. 98  The 
complaint further alleged that the Del Monte board should have notified 
Vestar that KKR had agreed to match its bid. 99  The most compelling 
element of this claim was that “KKR and Centerview then, with the approval 
of the Del Monte Board, approached Vestar and invited their most likely 
competitor to join the Sponsor group instead of engaging in a competitive 
auction.”100 The complaint also alleged that the Del Monte board of directors 
allowed KKR to “buy the support” of Barclays by seeking Barclays’ assistance 
in financing the merger, and further breached its fiduciary duty by permitting 
Barclays to conduct the go-shop process despite this “obvious conflict.”101 
 
94 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 64, at 5. 
The $23.5 million success fee would be reduced by the amount of the fee paid for Barclays’ fairness 
opinion. Id. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 130. 
97 Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 44. 
98 Id. para. 7. 
99 Id. paras. 63-64. 
100 Id. para. 9. 
101 Id. paras. 10-11. 
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B. Inadequate Disclosures 
The plaintiffs also argued that Del Monte failed to adequately disclose 
information regarding the process that resulted in the proposed acquisition; 
the details of KKR’s communications with Del Monte’s management and 
with Vestar; the financial advisors in the transaction; and the details of both 
fairness opinions.102 Del Monte promptly issued a proxy supplement, which 
mooted these claims.103 
C. Duty of Care 
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also sought relief on the theory 
that the Del Monte board breached its duty of care by failing to adequately 
oversee Barclays, thereby permitting Barclays to secretly pair Vestar with 
KKR in violation of their confidentiality agreements, and to seek financing 
opportunities from KKR.104 After discovery, two points became clear: (1) that 
Barclays—not the London Evening Standard105—was the impetus behind the 
anticompetitive KKR–Vestar pairing, and (2) that Barclays had structured 
the deal to include buy-side financing because it had planned from the 
outset to contribute part of that financing.106 Thus, the plaintiffs claimed 
that Del Monte’s board should have recognized and prevented Barclays’ 
conflict of interest in the transaction. 
V. THE DECISION 
The court held that the Del Monte board breached its fiduciary duty of care 
by failing to recognize and prevent Barclays’ conflict of interest in servicing the 
merger, and that KKR aided and abetted the board’s breach.107 Because the 
plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, the opinion primarily assesses the 
probability of success on the merits108—specifically, the duty of care claim. 
Because Del Monte had placed itself up for sale, the court identified 
Revlon as the applicable standard of review, noting that the board was 
required to “try in good faith, in such a setting, to get the best available 
 
102 Id. paras. 78-88. 
103 In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also Del 
Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 64. 
104 Amended Consolidated Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 1. 
105 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
106 See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817. 
107 Id. at 818. 
108 See id. at 830-37. 
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transaction for the shareholders,” and that the board’s actions must have 
been “reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective.”109 The opinion 
acknowledges the importance of a board’s reliance on experts in evaluating 
the merits of a transaction, but notes that because investment banks play 
such a vital role in acting as experts, “this Court has required full disclosure 
of investment banker compensation and potential conflicts.”110 While the 
court pointed out that the board could potentially have negotiated a higher 
price when KKR requested to team up with Vestar, its primary concern was 
that the board accepted Barclays’ request to provide financing when it 
instead could have obtained a disinterested negotiator.111 Likewise, the court 
found it was unreasonable for the board to allow Barclays to conduct the go-
shop when it was in Barclays’ interest for the go-shop to fail.112 In determin-
ing that the board had acted unreasonably, the court ultimately concluded 
that “[a]lthough the blame for what took place appears at this preliminary 
stage to lie with Barclays, the buck stops with the Board.”113 Even though a 
board is entitled to rely on experts, “when [it] is deceived by those who will 
gain from such misconduct, the protections girding the decision itself 
vanish”; accordingly, the Del Monte directors “failed to act reasonably in 
connection with the sale process.”114  
 
109 Id. at 830 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Id. at 831-32. 
111 See id. at 834-35 (“[I]t was unreasonable for the Board to permit Barclays to take on a 
direct conflict when still negotiating price.”). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 836 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also David A. Katz, Del Monte 
and the Responsibility of a Board in a Sales Process, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/14/del-monte-and-the-
responsibility-of-a-board-in-a-sales-process (“The opinion of Vice Chancellor Laster in the Del 
Monte case is a powerful reminder to directors that actions such as hiring advisors and forming 
special committees—while appropriate and even essential in some circumstances—do not obviate 
the need for members of the board to be fully engaged in and actively supervising the process of 
negotiating a significant company transaction.”); Theodore Mirvis, Buyout and Deal Protections 
Enjoined Due to Conflicted Advisor, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/02/16/buyout-and-deal-protections-
enjoined-due-to-conflicted-advisor (“[T]he decision serves as an important reminder to all 
participants in M&A transactions that the terms of confidentiality agreements should be properly 
respected, that bankers should receive and follow clear instructions from selling boards, and that 
bankers should ensure that any conflicts of interest are disclosed in advance, with specificity, to 
the selling board of directors.”); Theodore Mirvis, Del Monte Settlement Highlights Risk of Conflicts 
in Buyout Financing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/21/del-monte-settlement-highlights-risk-of-conflicts-
in-buyout-financing (noting that the Del Monte “board was faulted for failing to take sufficiently 
strong measures to restore a fair process or oversee its advisor”). The plaintiffs put it bluntly in 
their brief: “[T]he Board of Directors of Del Monte, repeatedly misled by its faithless financial 
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As a result of the board’s breach of its fiduciary duties, the court found 
that failing to issue a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable 
harm to Del Monte’s stockholders. The court reasoned that in the absence 
of an injunction, “the Del Monte stockholders [would] be deprived forever 
of the opportunity to receive a pre-vote topping bid in a process free of 
taint from Barclays’ improper activities,” and that the 102(b)(7) exculpation 
provision in Del Monte’s certificate of incorporation would render future 
monetary damages unlikely if the transaction went through.115 Ultimately, 
the shareholder vote was enjoined for twenty days, and, in order to allow 
additional time for Del Monte to receive more bids, the Vice Chancellor 
prohibited the parties from enforcing the no-solicitation, match-right, and 
termination fee provisions contained in the merger agreement.116 The Vice 
Chancellor also awarded the plaintiffs $22.3 million in attorney’s fees.117 
VI. AFTER THE DECISION 
Over the twenty days during which the merger was enjoined, Del Monte 
hired Perella Weinberg to conduct another go-shop; the investment bank 
contacted seventy potential bidders, including forty-two strategic buyers.118 
No additional bids resulted from that go-shop.119 The merger did eventually 
close in April 2011, after a shareholder vote in early March.120  Richard 
 
advisor throughout the process, was out getting popcorn while this whole movie was being 
produced.” Brief in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 1.  
115 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 838. A 102(b)(7) provision limits or eliminates a director’s personal 
liability for monetary damages arising from a breach of fiduciary duty, but does not limit liability 
(1) for a breach of the director’s duty of loyalty or (2) for acts or omissions not in good faith, or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (2011). 
116 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 818-19.  
117  Jef Feeley, Del Monte Foods Wins Final Approval of Settlement of KKR Buyout Suits, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-01/del-monte-wins-
approval-of-settlement-of-kkr-buyout-suits-1-.html; see also Eric S. Waxman & Robert S. 
Saunders, Southern Peru: Debunking the Myth, SEC. LITIG. REP., Feb. 2012, at 1 (suggesting that 
the Del Monte decision exhibits Delaware courts’ willingness to award interim fees to plaintiffs’ 
counsel, since Vice Chancellor Laster awarded $2.75 million in fees before the case settled for 
plaintiffs’ counsel’s role in securing additional disclosures in the merger proxy statement). 
118 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFA ��A), 
at 1 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/866873/000119312511055113/ 
ddefa14a.htm. 
119 Id. 
120 Katz, supra note 114. Of the shares that voted, 99% voted in favor of the merger. Jef 
Feeley & Phil Milford, Del Monte, Barclays Pay $89.4 Million to Settle Buyout Suits, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-06/del-monte-
barclays-pay-89-4-million-to-settle-buyout-suits.html; see also Individual Del Monte Defendants’ 
 
11 White Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 2:08 PM 
2013] Investment Bank Fee Structures and Del Monte Foods 109 
Wolford stepped down from his position as Del Monte CEO shortly 
thereafter.121 The parties settled in November 2011 for $89.4 million.122 Of 
that total, Del Monte paid $65.7 million, $20 million of which was owed to 
Barclays for its work on the deal; Barclays contributed $23.7 million.123 
A November 2011 court filing stated that federal prosecutors were inves-
tigating potential antitrust violations surrounding the merger. 124  At the 
same time, shareholders brought suit in California alleging antitrust viola-
tions, but unsuccessfully argued that the settlement should go unapproved 
in Delaware because it would render their California claims moot.125 As a 
result of the Del Monte decision, at least nine major investment banks have 
reexamined their lending processes.126 
VII. WHY BLAME BARCLAYS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
The court explained that the Del Monte board breached its duty of care 
“[b]y failing to provide the serious oversight that would have checked 
Barclays’ misconduct.”127 That misconduct involved (1) soliciting interest 
from bidders before Del Monte was up for sale,128 (2) planning to seek the 
board’s permission to provide financing to an acquirer in the event that the 
company was sold,129 (3) pairing KKR with Vestar in violation of their 
confidentiality agreements with Del Monte,130 and (4) conducting the go-shop 
after Del Monte agreed to allow Barclays to provide financing to KKR.131  
At first glance, one might read the Del Monte decision as imposing a duty 
on a board of directors to identify and prevent all conflicts of interest faced 
 
Answer, supra note 77, at 14 (“[A]s of March 8, 2011, approximately 99% of the 151,400,000 shares 
voted were cast in favor of the transaction at $19 per share.”). 
121 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55. 
122 Feeley, supra note 117. The settlement gave shareholders about $0.50 more per share than 
the original purchase price. Id. 
123 Feeley & Milford, supra note 120. 
124 See Jef Feeley, Del Monte, KKR Deal Faces U.S. Antitrust Probe, Lawyer Says, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-30/del-
monte-kkr-deal-faces-u-s-antitrust-probe-lawyer-says.html. 
125 Feeley, supra note 117. 
126 Feeley & Milford, supra note 120. In the months following Del Monte, “no firm . . . 
offered sell-side financing for a U.S. public company buyout valued at more than �� billion”; prior 
to Del Monte such financing was offered in 40% of the deals of that size. Id.; see also Chon & 
Ovide, supra note 28 (noting that despite criticism for creating conflicts of interest, staple 
financing was “common during the buyout boom of ����”). 
127 In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
128 Id. at 820. 
129 Id. at 833. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 828. 
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by investment bankers hired in conjunction with the sale of a company. 
This reading, however, is far too broad. First, although the court found that 
the board failed to exercise oversight in identifying conflicts, it also 
acknowledged that “[i]nvestment banks generate large fees from doing deals,” 
and that “[c]overage officers for investment banks regularly visit past, present, 
and potential clients to suggest mergers, acquisitions, and other strategic 
alternatives.”132 Given these statements, it seems as though Barclays acted the 
way any other investment bank in the industry might have acted.  
Second, the court recognized that the fee structures common in sell-side 
advising engagements provide incentives for investment banks to drum up 
business by actively pairing targets and acquirers. 133  As mentioned in 
Section I.B., “incentive” or “success” fees encourage investment banks not 
only to seek out the highest price for a company up for sale, but to execute a 
sale regardless of whether it is necessarily in the best interests of a company 
at that time. 134  And yet, despite the conflicts they generate, then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine recognized in Toys “R” Us that Delaware courts condone 
incentive fees.135  
A narrower and more consistent reading of the Del Monte decision, then, 
is that the duty of care requires a board to identify and guard against 
unusual conflicts, but not those conflicts that are widely accepted in Dela-
ware practice. With this narrower understanding of Del Monte in mind, I 
analyze what the Del Monte board and Barclays did wrong, and then 
consider how to approach the somewhat arbitrary distinction between conflicts 
that the industry accepts and the “unusual” conflicts present in Del Monte. 
A. What the Board Didn’t Do Wrong: Preventing Extra  
Conflicts or Requiring Additional Disclosure 
The court acknowledged that “[t]his case is difficult because the Board 
predominantly made decisions that ordinarily would be regarded as falling 
within the range of reasonableness for purposes of enhanced scrutiny.”136 If 
 
132 Id. at 819. 
133 See id. 
134 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
135 In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005 & n.44 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also 
id. at 1005-06 (holding that, even though “First Boston’s engagement provided for higher 
compensation if it found a high-value, whole-Company deal rather than simply a buyer for Global 
Toys,” there was still “simply no basis to conclude that First Boston’s questionable desire to 
provide buy-side financing ever influenced it to advise the board to sell the whole Company rather 
than pursue a sale of Global Toys”). 
136 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817. 
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the board’s actions ordinarily would have been reasonable, then what, under 
the facts of Del Monte, made its actions unreasonable? One way to approach 
this inquiry is to ask, if the conflicts investment banks face in typical merger 
transactions are acceptable under Delaware law, which of Barclays’ conflicts 
went above and beyond these generally accepted conflicts? Alternatively, 
the Del Monte decision might indicate that the board should have exercised 
greater diligence by asking Barclays questions to determine whether it had 
any conflicts of interest that it failed to disclose. In response to Del Monte, 
one practitioner has suggested that to avoid liability, a board should ask its 
advisors at the very beginning of the engagement to identify any potential 
conflicts that may arise during the course of the transaction.137 This advice 
suggests that disclosure of conflicts, rather than the existence of a conflict in 
itself, implicates duty of care issues. 
I would suggest, however, that more disclosure would not have made a 
difference in Del Monte. In fact, regardless of whether the more important 
issue is disclosure or the existence of a conflict in the first place, disclosure 
of Barclays’ conflicts would have failed to alert the Del Monte board to the 
potential for misbehavior.  
1. Actual Conflicts 
If the court’s primary concern was the existence of actual conflicts in 
Barclays’ secretly seeking to provide financing, this view is problematic for 
two reasons. First, Barclays was interested in the outcome of the deal from 
the beginning. As Del Monte’s sell-side advisor, Barclays stood to gain 
roughly $20 million if the company was sold.138 This meant that it was 
already in Barclays’ interest to effectuate a sale regardless of whether the 
company would retain more value by remaining independent. In the back of 
Peter Moses’s mind was the fact that Barclays stood to gain an additional 
roughly $�� million by providing financing in the transaction—but again, 
only if the company was sold. 139  That Barclays thought there was $40 
million on the line rather than $20 million hardly changed Barclays’ incen-
tive to sell Del Monte Foods. 
 
137 See Katz, supra note 114; see also CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, LES-
SONS OF DEL MONTE FOODS FOR COMPANIES RUNNING (OR CONSIDERING) A SALE 
PROCESS 2 (2011), available at www.cgsh.com/files/News/��debb��-b4a1-4fa4-abde-53ddc5a28fcb/ 
Presentation/NewsAttachment/9fcaf89f-f120-468a-b625-559516615584/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Del%20 
Monte%20Foods.pdf (suggesting that when hiring an investment banker, companies should 
consider including a provision in the engagement letter that the banker may not, without board 
approval, offer to provide financing services to a prospective bidder). 
138 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra text accompanying note 94. 
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Second, the possibility of providing financing meant that it was in Bar-
clays’ interest to find a buyer who might require financing. I would argue, 
however, that at the beginning of any sell-side engagement with a full-
service investment bank, either (�) the possibility of providing financing in 
the deal is always open to the bank and therefore can always affect its 
involvement in a deal, or in the alternative, (2) the possibility of providing 
financing is so remote that, even if desired by the bank, that prospect will 
not affect how the bank proceeds with the deal. Either way, the possibility 
of providing financing affects all full-service banks equally—as long as 
staple financing is permitted under Delaware law.140 And the only way that 
the Del Monte board could have fully eliminated any conflicts arising from 
the possibility of providing financing would have been by foreclosing that 
possibility at the beginning of its engagement with Barclays, which is not 
required under Delaware law.141 Further, it is not entirely clear that prohib-
iting staple financing in an engagement letter would prevent all conflicts. 
For example, even if full-service banks are not all seeking to provide 
financing, it might be the case that they are seeking to please the private 
equity firms bidding for target companies.142 Private equity firms represent 
60% of investment banks’ top clients, and even when banks are not interested 
in providing financing, they have significant financial interests in obtaining 
future business from these firms.143 
2. Disclosure of Conflicts 
If, however, disclosure of conflicts is the more important issue, then the 
Del Monte board could have asked in its engagement letter that Barclays 
 
140 See Foulds, supra note 15, at ��� (noting that there is no per se rule against staple financ-
ing in Delaware). Since staple financing has not been invalidated as per se illegal, the somewhat 
arbitrary and unverifiable factor becomes: when did it occur to the investment bank that it might 
provide financing? From the outset of the deal, like Barclays in Del Monte, see 25 A.3d at 817, or 
just before the agreement was approved, like First Boston in Toys “R” Us? See 877 A.2d at 1005. 
141 See Foulds, supra note 15, at 525. 
142 This argument is particularly relevant to Del Monte, as Barclays had a prior relationship 
with KKR. See 25 A.3d at 820 (“Like many large banks, Barclays has strong relationships with 
various [leveraged buyout] shops. KKR is one of Barclays’ more important clients.”). Yet 
companies often value investment banks’ longstanding relationships with private equity firms. See, 
e.g., New Mountain Finance Corp., Prospectus Supplement, at S-7 (Mar. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1491925/000104746913003145/a2213796z497.htm (“Further-
more, the Investment Adviser's investment professionals have deep and longstanding relationships 
in both the private equity sponsor community and the lending/agency community which they 
have and will continue to utilize to generate investment opportunities.”). 
143 See, e.g., Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820 (noting that Barclays had earned over $66 million in 
fees from KKR prior to the Del Monte acquisition). 
11 White Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 2:08 PM 
2013] Investment Bank Fee Structures and Del Monte Foods 113 
disclose any possible conflict that might occur over the course of the 
engagement. Indeed, the most effective way to deal with investment banks’ 
conflicts may simply be to ensure that the client, the board of the target 
company, is aware of each conflict that exists, so that legal counsel can 
advise the board as to how to proceed.144 While Barclays did disclose to the 
board of directors that it had a potential conflict in acting as both Del 
Monte’s sell-side advisor and KKR’s financer, that disclosure came only 
after Barclays had planned all along to seek permission to provide the 
financing. If Barclays had been up front from the beginning, however, what 
might its disclosures have looked like?  
1. Receiving incentive fees contingent on the consummation of a transaction 
creates an incentive for the investment bank to approve a transaction regard-
less of whether that transaction is truly advisable. 
2. If, in the future, the investment bank wishes to provide financing to an 
acquirer, and the company permits the investment bank to provide such 
financing, the investment bank will be incentivized to sell the company to a 
party who requires financing. 
These conflicts are common to all investment banks, and requiring such 
disclosures would essentially create a boilerplate conflicts provision for all 
engagement letters that would do little to alter target boards’ oversight of 
the sale process. 
B. What the Board Did Wrong: Conducting the Go-Shop 
By arguing that Barclays’ conflicts in the Del Monte transaction should 
not have raised red flags at the beginning of its engagement, I do not mean 
to suggest that the board was entirely without fault. It is important to 
recognize that when the possibility of Barclays providing financing became a 
reality, Barclays did in fact face an extraordinary conflict. Even after the 
board permitted Barclays to participate in the financing, it allowed Barclays 
to conduct the go-shop. At this point, Barclays’ interests were clearly diver-
gent from those of a “nonconflicted” bank. A bank with a success fee but only 
a possibility of providing financing would be interested in producing a 
 
144 See Sal Guerrera et al., Stapled Financing in the Aftermath of Delaware’s Del Monte Decision, 
in SKADDEN 2012 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (2012), available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/ 
files/publications/Skadden_����_Insights_Capital_Markets_�.pdf (advising that, in light of Del 
Monte, a board should “evaluate any prior or existing relationships that the financial advisor has 
with actual or potential bidders and determine whether any potential conflicts of interest are likely 
to develop, in each case carefully reflecting such consideration in its board minutes”). 
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topping bid in the go-shop to attain the highest possible value for the 
company, and, therefore, the highest fees for the bank; Barclays, however, 
had already secured permission to provide financing to a specific acquirer 
and was not interested in finding another buyer who might not require its 
financing. The board should have recognized this conflict and should not 
have allowed Barclays to conduct the go-shop. 
C. The Standard for Investment Bank Conflicts Going Forward 
On one hand, Delaware law has addressed the question of success fees 
and has held that they are not per se illegal; in fact, they create conflicts 
that nearly all investment banks in the industry share. On the other hand, 
however, the court in Del Monte suggested that a board has a duty to seek 
out and address—either by eliminating or disclosing—its investment bank’s 
conflicts before it can rely on its bank’s advice in selling the company. With 
so many conflicts implicitly accepted in the industry, the outcome in Del 
Monte seems on some level arbitrary. After all, why accept Barclays’ roughly 
$20 million incentive to push a sale through, but reject an additional $20 
million incentive to select a bidder who requires financing? With a duty of 
care standard that requires directors to identify and correct or disclose some 
conflicts but not others, courts are left with two choices: accept the fact that 
investment banks as we currently use them are fundamentally conflicted, or 
require a dramatic restructuring of the fee arrangements used in nearly all 
M&A deals. 
One is tempted to argue that investment bank conflicts do not deserve 
the attention they received after Del Monte. For one, reputational effects 
may reign in investment banks’ behavior even where conflicts exist. 145 
Further, it may be that “[m]anagement is sophisticated, and they hire the 
bank not for advice in deciding between bids but for their contacts and 
knowledge of prospective bidders.”146 This view may soften one’s outlook 
on Barclays’ behavior, but it also weakens the claim that investment banks 
have financial expertise upon which directors can rely. Even so, one might 
argue that Barclays’ conflicts did not make a difference for the Del Monte 
board. Several market leaks alerted potential bidders to the fact that the 
 
145 C.f. Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 365, 386 (2012) (suggesting that investment banks acting as underwriters in the 
securities offering context have strong incentives to build and maintain reputations for diligence 
and honesty). 
146 Foulds, supra note 15, at 529. 
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company was up for sale;147 Barclays did contact more than fifty potential 
acquirers during the first go-shop period;148 and even after the litigation, 
Perella Weinberg’s go-shop did not lead to any topping bids.149 We already 
accept conflicts arising out of success fees—why arbitrarily reject other 
conflicts as too much? 
Another almost assuredly unpopular suggestion, but one I am inclined 
to accept, would be to eliminate success fees in the industry altogether. The 
facts of Del Monte suggest that serious manipulation will result when the 
industry looks the other way as experts upon whom boards heavily rely in 
large-scale transactions suffer from conflicts of interest. While the court in 
Del Monte attempted to characterize Barclays’ conflicts as more serious than 
those that generally exist in the industry, I have suggested in this Note that 
they are not so easily distinguishable. The best way to prevent future 
manipulation is to eliminate success fees and staple financing altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
The court’s dissection of Barclays’ misbehavior in Del Monte brought 
attention to the conflicted position of an investment bank that gives sell-
side advice while secretly planning to later provide buy-side financing. 
While the Del Monte court imposed upon a board a duty to either eliminate 
or disclose conflicts, some conflicts—like staple financing—are not per se 
illegal under Delaware law, and others—like success fees—are widely used 
in the industry. But these are the only conflicts that plagued Barclays in the 
Del Monte transaction. In order to prevent manipulation that ultimately 
may harm stockholders, investment bank conflicts should be minimized 
through the elimination of both success fees and staple financing.  
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